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The Ongoing
Reconstruction of
The Korean
Criminal Justice System
Kuk Cho∗

I. Introduction
The Korean criminal justice system has been rapidly changing since
democratization. The authoritarian regime, which valued “crime control” over
“due process” in regard to criminal procedure, ended thanks to the June Movement
of 1986. The 1987 Constitution, as a product of democratization, provides a
blueprint for a new criminal procedure. Explicitly stipulating the “due process”
value,1 the Bill of Rights in the Constitution provides very detailed provisions
regarding criminal procedure.2 The 1988 and 1995 amendments to the Korean
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2.
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The Constitution of the Republic of Korea (heonbeop) art.12(1)(3), last revised Oct. 29,
1987 as Constitution No. 10.
For instance, included in the Bill of Rights are strict requirements for obtaining judicial
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Criminal Procedure Code have also strengthened the procedural rights of criminal
suspects and defendants.3 Since then, procedural rights in criminal procedure have
been taken seriously, and momentous changes in the theory and practice of
criminal procedure have been observed.4 More recently, since the Roh Moo-Hyun
government was launched in February 25, 2003, the Korean criminal justice
system has been asked to change more drastically. The Judicial Reform
Committee under the Supreme Court and its subsequent task force organization,
the Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, have actively worked to
increase civil participation in criminal trials and to reform evidence law. Also the
National Assembly has been discussing how to reallocate the investigative power
between the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office and the National Police Agency.
This article outlines the ongoing reconstruction of the Korean criminal justice
system and examines the major issues involved. First, it starts with a review of the
landmark decisions by the Korean Supreme Court and the Korean Constitutional
Court to strengthen the procedural rights in the criminal process. Second, it
reviews the bill submitted by the Presidential Committee on judicial reform, in
2005, to adopt the civil participation system in criminal trials. Third, it explores
how the laws of evidence have changed since submitted by the Presidential
Committee on judicial reform, in 2005, focusing on the admissibility of the

3.

4.

warrants for compulsory measures, the right not to be tortured, privilege against selfincrimination, right to counsel, right to be informed of the reason for arrest or detention,
right to request judicial hearing for arrest or detention, exclusionary rule of illegally
obtained confession, protection against double jeopardy, right to fair trial, right to speedy
and open trial, presumption of innocence, and right to compensation for the suspect and
defendant found innocent. The Korean Constitution, arts. 12, 13(1), 16, 27.
The 1995 amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code newly introduced the preliminary
hearing system for issuing a detention warrant. Before issuing a detention warrant, the
judge, upon his/her own initiative, can schedule a hearing for a substantial review of the
necessity of the detention of the suspect, arrested or not, in which the suspect must
participate Korean Criminal Procedure Code [hyeongsa sosongbeop] (Law No. 341, Sept.
23, 1954, last revised Oct. 16, 2004 as Law No. 7225), art. 201(3). Before 1995, there was
no hearing system. Rather, the judge issued the detention warrant after reviewing only the
documents referred by the prosecutor. Because of strong resistance from the investigative
authorities, however, the new system was revised in 1997 to work only upon the request of
the suspect or his/her lawyer. The Criminal Procedure Code also provides habeas corpus for
the arrested or detained suspect to review the legality and properness of the arrest or
detention. The 1997 amendment established a bail system for suspects who have requested
habeas corpus. Korean Criminal Procedure Code, art. 201(4), 214. Although it is limited
because it is not available for suspects who have not requested habeas corpus, it is certainly
an important advancement.
See Kuk Cho, Unfinished “Criminal Procedure Revolution” of Post-Democratization South
Korea, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 377 (2002), outlining the Korean criminal procedure
after democratization.
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prosecutor-made dossiers and videotapes recorded during interrogation. Finally,
this article reviews the recent dispute between the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office
and the National Police Agency to reallocate the investigative power between
them.

II. Taking Procedural Rights Seriously
A. Judicial Decisions to Adopt Miranda, Massiah and McNabb-Mallory
Under the new Constitution, criminal procedural rights have been taken very
seriously. However, more attention needs to be given to a series of legislative
decisions by the Supreme Court, which may be called the Korean version of
Miranda, Massiah and McNabb-Mallory.
First, in the decision of June 26, 1992, the Korean Supreme Court made a
landmark decision, which is often called the “New 21st Century Faction” case,
named after the title of the criminal organization the defendant belonged to. It held
that “statements elicited without informing [the suspect] of the right to silence in
interrogation are illegally obtained evidence, and so should be excluded, even if
they are disclosed voluntarily.”5 The Court excluded the defendant’s confession
by adopting the rationale of Miranda to exclude the confession, although the
Criminal Procedure Code does not have an explicit provision about the exclusion.
Second, in two National Security Act violation cases in the 1990s,6 the Supreme
Court also made landmark decisions, which may be called the Korean version of
Massiah. In these cases, the defendants requested to meet with their attorney when
they were detained but the National Security Agency officers rejected their request.
Then the defendants were referred to and interrogated by the prosecutor. The
Court held that “the limitation of the right to meet and communicate with counsel
violates the constitutionally guaranteed basic right, so the illegally obtained
confession of the suspect should be excluded, and the exclusion means a
substantial and complete exclusion.”
The Constitutional Court has also repeatedly confirmed that the right to counsel
in the criminal process is an “absolute right” of the defendant, so it cannot be
5.
6.

102

Decision of June 23, 1992, 92 Do 682 [Korean Supreme Court].
Decision of Aug. 24, 1990, 90 Do 1285 [Korean Supreme Court]. This case is popularly
called the “Legislator Seo Kyeong-Weon Case.” Decision of Sept. 25, 1990, 90 Do 1586
[Korean Supreme Court]. This case is popularly called the “Artist Hong Seong-Dam Case.”
Regarding the National Security Act, see generally Kuk Cho, Tension Between the National
Security Law and Constitutionalism in South Korea: Security for What?, 15 B.U. INT’L L.J.
173 (1997).
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limited “by any reason including national security, public order or public
welfare.”7
Third, in the decision of November 11, 2003, in a National Security Act
violation case of Professor Song Doo Yul, an allegedly pro-North, left-wing
Korean-German dissident who was arrested and detained when he visited Seoul,
the Supreme Court made another ground-breaking decision to recognize the right
to have counsel during interrogation as a constitutional right of suspects.8
Neither the Constitution nor the Criminal Procedure Code has an explicit
provision for the right to have a lawyer present during interrogation, although both
provide the right to counsel in general. On such a ground, law enforcement
authorities had not allowed defense counsel retained by suspects to attend
interrogation sessions until recently. Even if suspects are represented by counsel,
they are left without any professional aid in a critical stage of criminal procedure.
A majority of criminal law scholars and defense attorneys have argued for revising
the Criminal Procedure Code to stipulate the right to have counsel during
interrogation. In 1999, the National Police Agency issued a rule that allows
defense counsel to participate in police interrogation. After a murder suspect was
tortured to death during interrogation in the Seoul District Branch of the Supreme
Prosecutors’ Office in 2002, the Ministry of Justice also set up a similar rule.
However, both rules carry no legally binding force because they are no more than
administrative rules for law enforcement authorities. Furthermore, a number of
exceptions disallowing counsel’s participation are stipulated in the rules, and, in
practice, counsel’s participation in interrogation was nominal.
In these circumstances, the Supreme Court made another legislative decision. It
held that neither the Constitution nor the Criminal Procedure Code provides any
implication to prohibit counsel’s participation, so the participation should be
allowed from the standpoint of “due process” principles. Even without an explicit
provision to guarantee the right to have counsel present during interrogation, the
right can be recognized by analogical interpretation of Article 34 of the Criminal
Procedure Code which allows for “the right to meet and communicate [with]
counsel.” The Court also provides much narrower exceptions not to permit
counsel’s participation in interrogation that is the participation may be restricted
only when there is probable cause that the counsel would “obstruct interrogation”

7.
8.

Decision of Jan. 28, 1992, 91 Hun Ma 111 [Korean Constitutional Court]; Decision of July
21, 1995, 92 Hun Ma144 [Korean Constitutional Court]; Decision of Sept. 23, 2004, 2000
Hun Ma 138 [Korean Constitutional Court] (emphasis added).
Decision of Nov. 11, 2003, 2003 Mo 402 [Korean Supreme Court].
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or “leak the secret of investigation.” Since this decision, the lower courts have
excluded defendants’ statements that were elicited without their counsel’s
participation in interrogation.
Taken together, the 1992 “New 21st Century Faction” decision and the 2003
decision fully implement Miranda in Korea. Reviewing the infringement of a nondetained suspects’ right to counsel in a Public Office Election Act violation case,
the six to three opinion of the Constitutional Court in September 23, 2004 also
confirmed that the right to have counsel present during interrogation is a
constitutional right of the suspect.9 On July 18, 2005, the Presidential Committee
on the Judicial Reform (which was established on December 15, 2004) submitted a
bill for the revision of the Criminal Procedure Code to stipulate the right to have
counsel during interrogation.10
Fourth, in the decision of June 11, 2002, the Supreme Court held that, in a
bribery case, the dossiers including the defendant’s statement should be excluded
because they were obtained via an illegal “emergency arrest” that did not fulfill the
requirements of warrantless arrest in Article 200-3 (1) of the Criminal Procedure
Code.11 This decision may be called a Korean version of the McNabb-Mallory
rule.12 This decision is to deter the abuse of “emergency arrest” by law
enforcement authorities, which is virtually free of judicial review for forty-eight
hours.
As seen above, Miranda and Massiah have been received in Korea from across
the Pacific although they are often criticized as truth-impairing and pro-criminal in
their home country.13 McNabb-Mallory has also been adopted in Korea, despite its
substantial revision by the enactment of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Street Act of 1968 in the United States.14 Although the Supreme Court has not
adopted the Fourth Amendment Mapp exclusionary rule of the United States,15 the
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.
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Decision of Sept. 23, 2004, 2000 Hun Ma 138 [Korean Constitutional Court].
Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, Bill for the Revision of the Criminal
Procedure Code, art. 244-4 (2004) (S. Korea).
Decision of June 11, 2002, 2000 Do 5701 [Korean Supreme Court].
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957).
See OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ‘Truth in Criminal Justice’ Series Office of
Legal Policy: The Law of Pretrial Interrogation, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437, 535-36, 618
(1989); Akhil Reed Amar, Twenty-fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Foreward:
Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 644 (1996). See generally Akhil Reed
Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination
Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857 (1995); JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE
LAW (1993).
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2005).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Presidential Committee on Judicial Reform, on July 18, 2005, submitted a bill for
the Revision of the Criminal Procedure Code to generally accept the exclusionary
rule by providing “evidence obtained not through due process shall not be
admissible.”16
B. Other Judicial Decisions about Procedural Rights
Let us review other important decisions by the Constitutional Court and the
Supreme Court to strengthen the procedural rights of suspects/defendants.
1. Invalidating the Excessively Lengthy Detention Period of the National
Security Act
In the decision of April 14, 1992, the unanimous opinion of the Constitutional
Court held the fifty day detainment period under Article 19 of the National
Security Act to be excessively lengthy, and thus unconstitutional.17 It stated:
Because the prerequisites of articles 7 and 10 of the National Security Act are not
particularly complicated and collection of evidences is not so difficult, the extension up to
fifty days by article 19 of the National Security Law for the crimes of articles 7 and 10 . . .
is to balance wrongly the mutually conflicting relation between the state’s power of
punishment and the nation’s basic rights, and permit unnecessarily long detention, then
apparently violate the principle of prohibition of excessiveness in article 37(2) of the
Constitution, which is a principle to restrict basic rights, and infringe personal liberty of

16.

17.

Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, Bill for the Revision of the Criminal
Procedure Code, art. 308-2 (2004) (S. Korea). The Constitution and the Criminal Procedure
Code already provide explicit legal provisions regarding the exclusion of an involuntary
confession. Article 12(7) of the Constitution provides for the exclusion of involuntary
confessions made under torture, battery, threat, deceit or after prolonged custody. Following
Article 12(7), Article 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code also provides an exclusionary
rule for confessions whose voluntariness is doubtful.
A suspect in a National Security Law (NSL) case had to endure a very long pretrial
detention. The NSL creates an exception to the period of detention mandated by the
Criminal Procedure Code. According to the Code, a suspect may be detained for up to
forty-eight hours, or even seventy-two hours before a warrant is issued. The police may
then further detain the suspect for ten days after the warrant is issued. The prosecutor may
detain the suspect for another ten days before indictment and extend the detainment up to a
maximum additional ten days with a judge’s permission. The Korean Criminal Procedure
Code, arts. 203-205. The NSL adds a maximum additional twenty days to the detainment
periods delineated in the Criminal Procedure Code. Article 19 of the NSL allows a judge to
grant an extension of the detainment period to the police, and further allows a judge to grant
two additional detainment extensions to the prosecutor.
National Security Act
(kukgaboanbeop), Law No. 3318 (1980), last revised Dec. 13, 1997 as Law No. 5454
(1994), art. 19. In NSL cases, the practice is to grant almost automatic extensions. Thus,
suspects in NSL cases are usually detained for up to fifty days before indictment.
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18

the suspect, in dubio pro reo and right of speedy trial.

The Court came to recognize the excessiveness of Article 19 of the National
Security Act, which had been justified in the name of national security under the
authoritarian regime. Although the Court has been very reluctant to declare the
Act itself unconstitutional, it was certainly willing to correct severe procedural
hardship.
2. Bolstering the Right to Habeas Corpus.
Both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court have rendered significant
decisions about the right to habeas corpus.
First, in the decision of August 27, 1997, the Supreme Court held that a suspect
arrested without a warrant also has a right to request a judicial hearing to review
the appropriateness of the arrest.19 Article 214-1 of the Criminal Procedure Code
provides that the habeas corpus system is available for arrested or detained
suspects with a warrant, while Article 12(6) of the Constitution provides that
“everyone has a right to request judicial hearing when arrested or detained.”20 The
Court stated that, considering Article 12(6) of the Constitution, Article 214-1 of the
Criminal Procedure Code must not be interpreted in a way that deprives the
suspect arrested without warrant of the right to habeas corpus.
Second, in the Development Restriction Area Act violation case of March 25,
2004, the 6-to-3 opinion of the Constitutional Court held the prosecutor’s practice
of “blitz prosecution” to be unconstitutional.21 Article 214-1 of the Criminal
Procedure Code provides that the habeas corpus system is available for arrested or
detained suspects before prosecution, without mentioning if the system is available
for the accused persons after prosecution. Prosecutors often use a procedural tactic
of filing a prosecution immediately to remove suspects’ standing for the judicial
hearing when suspects request the hearing. The Court pointed out that “the blitz
prosecution” is a one-sided action by a prosecutor who has no authority in deciding
the constitutional legitimacy of the warrant, so it deprives the suspect who has
requested the judicial hearing of “procedural opportunity” to have his case
reviewed by the court.”22 Finally, in September 2004, the National Assembly
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
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Decision of April 14, 1992, 90 Hun Ma 82 [Korean Constitutional Court].
Decision of Aug. 27, 1997, 97 Mo 21 [Korean Supreme Court].
Korean Constitution, art. 12 (6); Korean Criminal Procedure Code, art. 214-1 (emphasis
added).
Decision of March 25, 2004, 2002 Hun Ba 104 [Korean Constitutional Court].
Id. The Court did not invalidate Article 214-1 itself because the invalidation may stop the
judicial hearing system itself.
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revised the Criminal Procedure Code to prohibit “blitz prosecution.”23
3. Steps toward Pre-trial Discovery
In two Constitutional Court decisions, strides have been made toward adopting
“pre-trial discovery” system. In the decision of November, 27, 1997, the seven-totwo opinion of the Constitutional Court held, in a National Security Act violation
case, that it is unconstitutional for prosecutors to prevent the defendants and their
attorneys from accessing the investigative records kept by prosecutors before a
trial is open after prosecution is filed.24 Article 35 of the Criminal Procedure Code
states that “defense counsel may review and copy the relevant documents or
evidence after the prosecution is filed.” Prior to the decision, prosecutors had
refused to allow defense attorneys to access the records, arguing that access is
possible only after a trial is open because access before the trial would weaken
prosecution’s cases. The Court held that “[t]he defense attorney’s access to the
investigative records kept by prosecutors is indispensable to maintain the
substantial equality between parties and materialize fast and fair trial. Excessive
limitation on the access violates the defendant’s right to fast and fair trial and right
to counsel.”25
It stated that counsel’s right to access the investigative records may be limited
only when “there exist concerns of leaking national secrets, eliminating evidence,
threatening witnesses, violating privacy or causing conspicuous obstacles to
investigation.”
In the decision of March 27, 2003, the five-to-four opinion of the Constitutional
Court extended the above 1997 decision to the setting of a fraud case where a
judicial habeas corpus hearing for the suspect was about to be held, even before
prosecution was filed,26 even though Article 35 of the Criminal Procedure Code
applies only after prosecution. The court stated that despite the words of the
Article, if the defense attorneys are not allowed to access to the investigative
records, they cannot sufficiently defend their clients in the habeas corpus hearing.
On July 18, 2005, the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reform submitted a
bill for the revision of the Criminal Procedure Code to adopt a new pre-trial
discovery system. It allows defendants or their attorneys to request that
prosecutors review or copy relevant documents or evidence that prosecutors
23. Korean Criminal Procedure Code, art. 214-2 (3).
24. Decision of Nov. 27, 1997, 94 Hun Ma 60 [Korean Constitutional Court].
25. Id.
26. Decision of March 27, 2003, 2000 Hun Ma 474 [Korean Constitutional Court].
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traditionally kept for themselves.27 If the request is denied, or the scope to review
is limited by the prosecutor, defendants or their attorneys may appeal to the court
to review the prosecutor’s decision.28
C. Conclusion
The Korean judiciary has moved away from the traditional notion that it is not
the judiciary’s job to discipline law enforcement authorities, either prosecutors or
police officers, and the belief that the judiciary needs to restrain itself from doing
legislative work.
The above decisions by the Supreme Court and the
Constitutional Court show that the judiciary now see themselves as having a
disciplinary and regulatory role regarding the illegal or improper misconduct of
law enforcement authorities, and it is willing to make legislative decisions when
procedural rights matter. In this sense, the decisions of the two superior courts
may be called a Korean version of the US “criminal procedure revolution”
propelled by the Warren Court. This change results from the vigorous efforts of
Korean defense attorneys who bravely fought against the authoritarian regime.

III. Reform toward Criminal Trial with Citizens’ Participation
A. Trial Solely by Professional Judges
Defendants in Korea are found guilty and given a sentence exclusively by a
professional judge because the Korean criminal justice system adopts neither the
US jury system nor the German mixed judge system [Schöffengericht]. Although
a few academics argued for the adoption of a citizens’ participation system in a
trial—emphasizing civil participation in a trial is an essential of political
democracy—both Korean judges and prosecutors, before and after
democratization, were very reluctant to listen to them until very recently. Judges
and prosecutors believed that civil participation would not only cost a lot but
would also result in the distortion of justice because of the “cronyism” of Korean
society. The O.J. Simpson case in 1995 was often cited to ridicule the absurdity of
a trial by jury. In addition it is also argued that civil participation in a trial would
be unconstitutional because Article 27 of the Constitution stipulates “the right to be
tried by judges qualified under the Constitution and relevant Acts,”29 not by lay
27.
28.
29.
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Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, Bill for the Revision of the Criminal
Procedure Code, art. 266-3 (2004) (S. Korea).
Id. at art. 266-4.
Korean Constitution, art. 27(1) (emphasis added).
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citizens. Defense attorneys and the public were not aware of the implication of
civil participation in trials until recently because most of their attention was
focused on the guarantee of the procedural rights of suspects and defendants.
However, a number of complaints about the judiciary have arisen. First, judges
have been criticized for being selected based upon their examination score.
Second, judges are said to monopolize the powers of both finding a defendant
guilty and later deciding a proper sentence. Third, judges are accused of not
making proceedings friendlier to citizens so that they can understand the
proceedings. There is an allegedly tacit custom inside the judiciary where
attorneys who have just resigned from the bench are more likely to get a favorable
decision from the bench. It is called a “courteous treat” (Cheonkwan Yewoo) for
those attorneys. Under these circumstances, civil participation in trials has been
gradually recognized as a meaningful and effective solution.
B. First Step towards “Criminal Justice of and by the People”
1. The Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Committee
under the Supreme Court
More calls for civil participation in trials have been made since the Roh MooHyun government, which calls itself the “Government of Participation,” was
established in February 25, 2003. Following an agreement between the president
and the chief justice on the judicial reform, the Judicial Reform Committee was
created and organized under the Supreme Court on October 28, 2003.30 The
Judicial Reform Committee submitted final recommendations on the last day of
2004, after one year of heated discussion and debate. The judiciary became very
supportive in adopting a civil participation system because it thought the new
system might free the judiciary from criticism by sharing responsibility about trials
with laymen.
The majority of the Committee agrees that civil participation in a trial is not
unconstitutional as long as professional judges take a substantial part in the trial.
The recommendations are summarized as follows:
First, “criminal justice of and by people” needs to be established without a
delay beyond “criminal justice for people.” Trials with civil participation will
strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the justice system, enhance the

30.

Judicial Reform Committee Home Page,
http://www.scourt.go.kr/information/jud_rfrm_comm/mtng_status/index.html.
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transparency of the system, and bring about people’s trust in and respect to the
system.
Second, the bill for trials with civil participation shall be prepared to make the
new trial system active from 2007. “The Committee for Civil Participation in
Justice” shall be organized in 2010 to evaluate the new trial system. The opinion
of participatory citizens remains recommendatory during the five years from 2007
to 2012. It will become mandatory after 2012.
Third, during the first five years from 2007 to 2012, trials with civil
participation apply to felony cases unless the defendants object, and the number of
such trials needs to be limited to about one to two hundred cases per year. The
extension of trials with civil participation to other crimes will be considered after
reviewing the five years.
Fourth, three professional judges and five to nine participatory citizens work
together in the trial with civil participation.
Fifth, participatory citizens are selected by using the electoral register or
national ID data, and are put in a review process.
Sixth, the method of verdict in the new trial system needs to be a mixture of the
Anglo-American jury system and the Continental mixed judge system. With
professional judges’ instruction and guidance, participatory citizens discuss
whether the defendant is guilty or not. If they find the defendant is guilty, they can
submit their opinion about sentence.
2. The Bill for the Civil Participation in Criminal Trials Act
Prepared by the Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform
On December 15, 2004, the Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform31
was established to materialize the recommendation of the Judicial Reform
Committee. On May 16, 2005, the Presidential Committee submitted a bill for the
Civil Participation in Criminal Trials Act during the first five years from 2007 to
2012, and the Bill is currently being reviewed in the National Assembly and
expected to pass in the end of 2006. Let us review the basic characteristic of the
Korean jury trial in the bill.
First, the participatory citizens are termed “jurors” [Baesimwon].32 There was a
debate when the bill was prepared if the title of “citizen judge” [Simin Pansa] was

31.
32.
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Presidential Committee on Judicial Reform Home Page, http://www.pcjr.go.kr (last visited
Dec. 9, 2006) (website is in Korean).
Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, Bill for the Civil Participation in Criminal
Trials Act, art. 2 (2005) (S. Korea).
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to be given to them. The professional judges did not want the participatory
citizens to have the title of “judge,” but civil movement organizations, defense
attorneys and prosecutors argued the title should be given to the citizens.
Second, the new trial system applies is mainly limited to murder, manslaughter,
rape, robbery, and bribery felonies.33 The defendants are given a right to waive the
trial with civil participation, and the court should check with the defendants to see
if it is waived.34
Third, professional judges have the discretion to exclude civil participation, in
particular when jurors, juror candidates, or their families or relatives may face the
possible danger to their life, liberty or property; an accomplice of the defendant
refuse to be tried by jurors. Appeal is allowed to the judges’ decision to exclude
civil participation.35
Fourth, the number of the jurors is different according to the cases. It is nine in
the case that capital punishment or life imprisonment may be given to the
defendant; five in the case that the defendants admit being guilty; and seven in all
other cases.36
Fifth, the jurors are allowed to ask the presiding judge to ask a certain question
to the defendant or the witness, and to take notes during the trial with permission
of the judge.37 The Presidential Committee intends to reduce the possibility of a
“hung jury” and enhance the accuracy of the verdict.
Sixth, the verdict process is a combination of the US system and the German
system. At first, without the participation of the judge, jurors discuss the guilt of
the defendant and make a verdict by unanimous opinion. If half of the jurors
agree, the jurors can hear the judge’s opinion. If the jurors cannot reach a verdict,
the judge and jurors discuss the guilt of the defendant together. Then the jurors,
without the presence of the judge, make a verdict based upon the majority opinion
of the jurors. If the defendant is found guilty, jurors discuss the sentence with the
judge and submit their opinion. The opinion of the jurors about guilt and sentence
does not bind the judge’s decision about guilt and sentence. The verdict is not to
be read, but to be written down in a trial.38

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at art. 5.
Id. at art. 8.
Id. at art. 9.
Id. at art. 13.
Id. at art. 56.
Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, Bill for the Civil Participation in Criminal
Trials Act, art. 72 (2005) (S. Korea).
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C. Conclusion
Citizens’ participation in a trial has never been experimented with in the history
of the Korean criminal justice system. The characteristics of the Korean jury
trial—including the scope of the crimes to which a jury trial applies, the method
and process of verdict and the effect of jurors’ opinion in a verdict — are certainly
different from those of other countries. However, a jury trial will certainly change
the fundamentals of the criminal trial, modifying the role of the judge, the trial
strategy of both prosecutor and defense attorney, and the evidentiary rules. The
experiment during the first five years will be very valuable in building the new
basis of Korean criminal trials.
The task of the Korean “criminal procedure revolution” in its initial stage was to
vitalize the procedural rights in the criminal process and deter police misconduct.
The purpose of the second stage is to give judicial authority back to the people, to
strengthen the legitimacy of the justice system, and to enhance the transparency of
the system. Although there is a possibility that the Bill for the Civil Participation
in Criminal Trials will be delayed in passing because of a political confrontation
between the ruling liberal Uri Party and conservative Grand National Party, since
late 2003, the second stage of the “revolution” has begun in Korea.

IV. Reshuffling Evidence Law Regarding Prosecutor-Made
Dossiers and Videotapes
A. Prosecutor-Made Dossiers
1. Exceptionally Strong Evidentiary Power
Article 312(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code gives exceptionally strong
evidentiary power to prosecutor-made dossiers even if they are hearsay.39 It
provides that the interrogation dossiers, which include the defendant’s statement or
confession, may be admissible in a trial, first, if they are signed by the defendant
and made by prosecutors, and, second, “if there exist special circumstances which
make the dossiers reliable,” the dossiers are admissible without cross-examination
of the interrogators even if the defendants contend the contents of the dossiers do

39.
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defendants or their attorneys contend the contents of the dossiers do not match what the
defendants stated during interrogation. See id. at art. 312(2).
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not match what they stated during the interrogation.40 Assuming the interrogation
itself by prosecutors may fulfill the requirement of “special circumstances which
make the dossiers reliable,” the Supreme Court has recognized the legitimacy of
Article 312(1).41 Thus, prosecutors have enjoyed this evidentiary advantage,
emphasizing the National Assembly intended to make them “semi-judges.”
However, Article 312(1) makes it extremely difficult for the defendants to avoid
a guilty decision in a trial once they have made self-incriminating statements in
front of prosecutors. The disadvantage to the defendants is especially serious,
considering that before the Professor Song case of 2004 defendants had not been
allowed a lawyer during interrogation.42 A number of scholars and defense
attorneys have strongly criticized that the Article makes the prosecutor a de facto
judge, and make defendants’ statement in front of prosecutors in an interrogation
room de facto testimonies in a trial.
2. Efforts to Make Prosecutors an Adversarial Party, not “Semi-Judge”
The Judicial Reform Committee under the Supreme Court, in its final
recommendations on December 31, 2004, stated that the current provisions in the
Criminal Procedure Code are so dossiers-oriented that they infringe on the
defendants’ right to cross-examination, and need to be revised.
On April 15, 2005, accepting the above criticism on Article 312(1) and
following the recommendation of the Judicial Reform Committee, the Presidential
Committee on Judicial Reform submitted its first draft to revise the article so that
the interrogation dossiers made by prosecutors are inadmissible in a trial unless the
defendants agree to the use of them. At the same time, however, the draft allows
police officers or prosecutors who interrogated the defendants to testify against the
defendants when the defendants deny what is recorded in the dossiers. The
intention of the Committee was to abolish the phenomenon of “trial by dossiers”
where truth-finding is largely limited to the dossiers made by prosecutors, not on
the cross-examinations by the parties in front of judges in a courtroom. It comes
from an idea that the status of prosecutors as “semi-judges” should be dismantled
and prosecutors should be an adversarial party in every sense.
However, the draft caused strong objection from prosecutors although it
attracted praise from defense attorneys and academics. Prosecutors criticized the
40.
41.
42.

Id. at art. 312(1).
Decision of March 8, 1983, 82 Do 3248 [Korean Supreme Court]; Decision of June 26,
1984, 84 Do 748 [Korean Supreme Court].
Decision of Nov. 11, 2003, 2003 Mo 402 [Korean Supreme Court].
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draft as allowing defendants to easily invalidate their confession or statement in the
interrogation room later in a trial, thus incapacitating prosecutors to fight against
crime. The prosecutors were very uncomfortable that they might be called as a
witness to testify regarding the defendant’s statements and be cross-examined by
defense attorneys. They were also unsatisfied with the draft article because it
might undermine their status of “semi-judge” and make them no more than an
adversarial party.43 Prosecutors in the Seoul District Branch of the Supreme
Prosecutors’ Office even held a meeting to criticize the draft and distributed a
public statement against it. Even the opposing political party joined the criticism,
arguing that the draft is a “conspiracy” to weaken the powers of prosecutors who
are not cooperative with the Roh government. Then, heated debate proceeded both
inside and outside of the Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform.
While the debate was going on, the Constitutional Court, in the decision of May
26, 2005, reviewed the constitutionality of Article 312(1).44 The five-to-four
opinion of the Court held the requirement of “special circumstances which make
the dossiers reliable” constitutional.
However, six out of nine Justices
recommended removing the vagueness of the requirement. In particular, four
Justices, in their dissenting opinion, stated that special evidentiary power may be
given to the prosecutor-made dossiers only when “procedural transparency of the
interrogation by prosecutors is reinforced and the defense attorney’s participation
in the interrogation is guaranteed.”
3. Conclusion
The hot debate over Article 312(1) ended in a compromised way. The first draft
neither got strong support from judges (afraid it could make trials more complex
and lengthy), nor from the public (afraid it could free criminals who have changed
their mind after they confessed in front of prosecutors).
The Presidential Committee confirmed a new draft on July 18, 2005 which
keeps the evidentiary power of the prosecutor-made interrogation dossiers alive but
imposes stricter requirements. In particular, it specifies the requirement of “special
circumstances which make the dossiers reliable,” following the Constitutional
Court’s recommendation. Article 312(1) of the new draft provides that prosecutormade interrogation dossiers, which include defendant’s statements, may be
43.

44.
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See CHOSUN ILBO, Jan. 16, 2005; DONG-A ILBO, Jan. 16, 2005; HANKYOREH SHINMOON,
Jan. 16, 2005. Prosecutors further argued that a plea bargaining system should be adopted
to compensate for the difficulties that they could face in trials if the draft would be passed
in the National Assembly.
Decision of May 26, 2005, 2003 HunKa 7 [Korean Constitutional Court].
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admissible in a trial first if they are made by legal process and method, second if it
is proven by the defendants’ admission in a preliminary hearing or a trial or by an
objective method such as videotaping that the dossiers are recorded as the
defendants have stated, and third if it is proven that they are made under especially
reliable circumstances, like the presence of the defendant’s attorney during an
interrogation.45
On the other hand, Article 316(1) of the draft provides that the testimony of
investigators, either prosecutors or police officers, regarding the defendant’s
statements may be admissible in a preliminary hearing or a trial. The new bill is
currently being reviewed in the National Assembly and expected to pass in the end
of 2006.
Under the new bill, prosecutors are given two options to rebut the defendants’
denial of what they stated in an interrogation room. They probably prefer Article
312(1) because it would be an unimaginable insult for them to be cross-examined
by defense attorneys. The initial plan of the Presidential Committee failed.
However, it is certainly an important advancement to establish much stricter
requirements to admit the prosecutor-made interrogation dossiers as evidence in
trials, which renders the interrogation process more transparent and more reliable.
B. Videotapes
There has been no provision about the evidential power of the videotapes
recorded during interrogation in the Criminal Procedure Code. Until recently the
videotapes have been considered evidential hearsay and they have rarely been used
in practice by law enforcement authorities. The Supreme Court has considered
videotapes the same as the interrogation dossiers.46
Things have changed since videotaping was recognized by law enforcement
authorities to prevent disputes over the admissibility and accuracy of the defendants’
statements during interrogation. In particular, the Department of Scientific
Investigation in the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office has been very active in
emphasizing the effectiveness of videotaping, and, in 2004, recommended the
Ministry of Justice and the Prosecutor General to adopt it. Prosecutors were
45.

46.

Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, Bill for the Revision of the Criminal
Procedure Code, art. 312(1) (2005) (S. Korea). The admissibility of the dossiers made by
police officers remains same as the current Article 321(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code,
although the police wanted to make the police-made dossiers have the same evidentiary
power as the prosecutor-made dossiers.
Decision of June 23, 1992, 92 Do 682 [Korean Supreme Court]; Decision of Sept. 3, 1999,
99 Do 2317 [Korean Supreme Court].
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encouraged by the mandatory videotaping experiments in other countries.47
Videotaping may result in increased costs due to purchasing video equipment,
altering interrogation rooms, and training investigative officers. However, the
costs of losing the evidentiary power far outweigh the costs of videotaping,
considering videotaping of interrogation as the best method of restoring public
confidence in confessions and avoiding cross-examination against police officers
or prosecutors. Videotapes are also an alternative means to save the evidentiary
power of the prosecutor-made interrogation dossiers. However, defense attorneys
are concerned that videotaping may simply provide legitimacy to the brutal
interrogations unless it is conducted under strict requirements.
The Presidential Committee accepted the prosecutors’ request to stipulate the
provisions regarding the evidential power of the videotapes recorded during
interrogation in the Criminal Procedure Code. The July 18, 2005 draft provides
the provision with strict requirements of the admissibility of videotapes. The first
set of requirements concern the admissibility of the videotapes. The defendant
must deny in a trial what they stated during interrogation by prosecutors or police
officers. Other methods of ascertaining the truth — such as statements made either
by the prosecutors, police officers or other participants in a preliminary hearing or
a trial — are difficult to prove the truth.48 When the first requirements are
satisfied, this means that the videotaping should be used as a secondary source to
find the truth.
The second set of requirements are that (i) the videotapes are made by legal
process and method, (ii) it is proven by the defendants’ admission or the statements
of prosecutors, police officers or other participants in a preliminary hearing or a
trial that the videotapes are objectively recorded, and (iii) it is proven that they are
made under especially reliable circumstances, for instance, with the presence of
their attorney during interrogation.”49 The second set of requirements are similar
to the requirement of the admissibility of the prosecutor-made interrogation
dossiers.
47.

48.
49.
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725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-2.1(b) (LexisNexis 2005); D.C. Code Ann. §5-133.20
(2005); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, §2803-B(1)(K) (West 2005); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 38.22 (Vernon 2005); The Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and
Questioning of Persons by Police Officers, para. 11.5 (a) (1984) (U.K.); Crimes Act of 1914,
art. 23V (Austl.); Crimes Act of 1900, art. 424A (N.S.W. Inc. Acts); Police Administration
Act of 1978, art. 139-43 (N. Terr. Austl. Laws); Summary Offenses Act of 1953, art. 74C-G
(S. Austl. Acts); Crimes Act of 1958, art. 464H-J (Vict. Acts); Jurisdiction and Criminal
Procedure Act of 1992, ch. LXA (W. Austl. Stat.).
Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, Bill for the Revision of the Criminal
Procedure Code, art. 312-2 (1) (2005) (S. Korea).
Id. at art. 312-2(2).
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The bill is currently being reviewed in the National Assembly and expected to
pass in the end of 2006. Video-taping the interrogation is quite a new concept in
the Korean criminal justice system. It would present a double-edged sword
because while it makes the interrogation process transparent and prevents law
enforcement authorities from misconduct, and allows fact-finder to see exactly
what occurred in the interrogation room, the problem is that it provides the jury
and the judges with a prejudice that incriminate the defendants. Korean law
enforcement authorities have swiftly begun to apply the new technique,
establishing special interrogation rooms with videotaping facilities. It is worthy to
observe what the new technique will bring to the Korean criminal justice system.

V. Reallocation of the Investigative Power between Prosecutors
and Police Officers
A. Prosecutors’ Dominance over Police Investigation Is Legally Guaranteed
Korean prosecutors have a duty to investigate crimes and prosecute criminals.
They can either direct the police investigation or investigate a crime themselves
with the investigative officers of the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office. The Supreme
Prosecutors’ Office has about 4,600 officers — roughly one-third the size of the
National Police Agency. Since the Criminal Procedure Code was enacted in 1954,
prosecutors have enjoyed their superior position to police officers because the
prosecutors are given legal authority to direct and supervise crime investigations
carried out by the police. Article 196 of the Code provides “police officers shall
investigate crimes with direction of prosecutors,” and Article 53 of the Supreme
Prosecutors’ Office Act also provides “police officers shall obey the orders issued
by prosecutors.” Prosecutors can not only request police officers to supplement
the investigation after the police investigation is completed, but can also intervene
in a police investigation and stop the police investigation. Prosecutors can order
the investigation transferred even before the investigation is finished by the police.
Thus, prosecutors are called “supervisor of investigation.”
In 1954, the National Assembly intended to give prosecutors control over police
officers, because most of them had served under the Japanese when the Japanese
ruled Korea as a colony. Most of those officers had no respect for human rights.
For this same reason, as reviewed in chapter IV, the dossiers made by police
officers have very weak evidentiary power.50 The police under the authoritarian
50.

Criminal Procedure Code art 312(2). See supra note 39.
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regime were criticized for brutality and corruption. They had obviously weak
grounds to try and argue for their independence from prosecutors’ control in crime
investigations. The police misconduct continued even after the authoritarian
regime ended.
Recently, since democratization, prosecutors have become a major target of
criticism because they have abused their authority and discretion both in
investigations and in prosecutions—especially in some high profile corruption
cases. This has fostered public distrust in the prosecutors. The “special
prosecutor” system, which is independent of the public prosecutor system, has
been introduced several times by the National Assembly as a means to check
politically motivated concealment, distortion, to curtail prosecutorial investigations
and reinforce the political neutrality of the prosecutorial authority. In addition, one
shocking incident cast doubt on the integrity of prosecutors: a murder suspect was
tortured to death by investigative officers with acquiescence of a prosecutor in the
Seoul District Branch of Supreme Prosecutors’ Office in 2002.
On the other hand, since democratization, police autonomy may be warranted.
The police have openly complained about their subservience to prosecutors. There
have been attempts to be granted more autonomy in investigating crimes. Several
elite police officers, who graduated from National Police University, have led the
campaign for independence from prosecutors. Accepting the criticism about the
police, the police have taken steps to reform their investigative system and to
strengthen the integrity of the police.
President Kim Dae-jung pledged to give the police autonomous power in
investigating less serious crimes when he was a presidential candidate in 1997.
However, his government dropped the matter after facing strong objection from the
Prosecutor’s Office.
B. Reallocation of the Investigative Power
It was not until in 2004, under the current Roh Moo-Hyun government, that a
joint committee was organized by the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office and the
National Police Agency to reallocate the investigative power between prosecutors
and police officers. Different from its predecessors, the Roh government is serious
and determined to solve this troublesome issue.
The joint committee, comprised of both the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office and
the National Police Agency, agreed that (i) in practice, police officers currently
initiate and have authority to initiate an investigation without prosecutors’
direction; (ii) police officers need to be given more autonomy to proceed with
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investigation; and (iii) prosecutors should check on an investigation in the final
stage of investigation because it is essential for a successful prosecution.
However, major unsolved issues remain for the committee. The first issue is
whether it is necessary to explicitly provide a “general” legal provision granting
the police the power to investigate crime in the Criminal Procedure Code. The
Supreme Prosecutors’ Office argues that it is unnecessary because police officers
already have investigative power based on some specific provisions of the Code.
More importantly, such a provision polarizes the power of investigation, confusing
the orderly mechanism of law enforcement authorities. The National Police
Agency contends such a provision is the minimum necessary to clearly confirm the
investigative powers of police officers.
The second issue is whether or not the prosecutorial supervision over the
investigation by police officers is still necessary, and if so, to what extent
prosecutors may direct police officers. Although the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office
agrees the extent and method of the prosecutorial supervision needs to be changed,
it contends the supervision itself must be remain untouched, arguing that
supervision is essential to assure the legality of police investigation. Prosecutors
are concerned that the centralized state police, without the prosecutorial
supervision, could become a super power and use their investigative power both
excessively and improperly.
The National Police Agency argues that it is time to abolish prosecutorial
intervention in the police investigation, and that it is time to reconstruct the
relationship in the crime investigation between two authorities as “equal and
cooperative,” not “superior-inferior.” They also contend that the new relationship,
where there would be no prosecutorial supervision, will make the police
investigation more responsible, the fight against crimes more simplified, and will
bring in a fair competition between two authorities for the fight against crime to
remove any possible concealment, distortion, or curtailment of investigation.
Although the joint committee did not reach full agreement, every issue
concerning investigative power was examined, and they submitted a few drafts for
the Criminal Procedure Code. Currently, both the Presidential Office and the
National Assembly are reviewing this thorny issue very seriously and exercising
great caution to avoid any objection from either authority. Both the Supreme
Prosecutors’ Office and the National Police Agency are lobbying desperately in an
attempt to receive favorable results.
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C. Conclusion
The tension between these two powerful law enforcement authorities is rising.
They are even showing hostility to each other. It is too hasty to predict how this
tricky project to reallocate the investigative power between the two will conclude.
However, it appears certain that police officers will be granted more autonomy in
crime investigations than they had before. Although it is certainly important, as
prosecutors argue, to deter police misconduct and to maintain the legality of police
investigations, it is doubtful that prosecutors — which are essentially law
enforcement authority — have been doing the job seriously and effectively.
Although it is true, as the police contend, that too many powers have been given to
prosecutors; the old problems of the police still remain. Regardless of the official
rationales and rhetoric given by each side, the essence of the tension is a power
struggle. The best resolution would be to establish a new system of checks and
balances between the two authorities. That would achieve the effectuation of both
the automony and legality of police investigation.51

VI. Conclusion
The Korean criminal justice system is in the process of total reconstruction.
The judicial decisions and the new legislation provide a new setting where all
members in the criminal justice system have to adjust. They are basically oriented
toward strengthening the defendants’ procedural rights, bestowing democratic
legitimacy to the system, and weakening the prosecutors’ position. Judges are
satisfied with the new system because they can still play a central role in trial and
supervise the misconduct of all law enforcement authorities while they share their
responsibility with the jury. Defense attorneys are happy about more procedural
rights and stricter evidence law in the new system. Prosecutors are gloomy
because their dominant status in criminal process tends to be limited in several
51.
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I personally, as a member of the joint committee, submitted a draft for the Criminal
Procedure Code, providing that (i) a “general” legal provision for the police power of
investigation is necessary to remove the gap between law and reality, while prosecutors as
lawyers have to be given authority to make general rules regarding investigation to remove
possible confusion and contradiction in the investigation; (ii) it is too early to remove all the
prosecutorial supervision over the police investigation, but the prosecutorial intervention in
the police intervention before the final stage of investigation needs to be limited to that of a
certain category of serious felonies such as homicide, narcotics related crimes, organized
crimes, national security related crimes and governmental officers’ crimes. While it has
been considered as a realistic alternative by the President’s Office, the National Assembly
and mass media, my compromising suggestion was not welcomed either by the Supreme
Prosecutors’ Office or the National Police Agency.
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aspects. Police officers are hopeful because there is possibility of the change of
their legal authority and power.
The reconstruction might seem “liberal.” It would be more correct, however, to
say that the reconstruction is to upgrade the Korean criminal justice system to the
level of contemporary democratic countries, and to neutralize a system that has
been overwhelmed by the crime control value for the past decades. Several bills to
reconstruct the Korean criminal justice system are currently stuck in the National
Assembly because of political confrontation around other more urgent national
issues — including transition of wartime operational control of Korean troops and
the rising problems with North Korea’s nuclear program. Even though the bills
failed to pass in 2006, they will not simply be tossed aside into a bin but will
certainly be put up again for review by the National Assembly after 2007.
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